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Abstract
The Russian GKO default crisis provides a unique window into the impact of
changing default probabilities and recovery ratio assumptions on credit-sensitive sovereign
bond prices. This paper introduces a joint implied parameter approach to extract both the
expected recovery ratio and the default probability term structure.  The methodology is
applied to both Russian Federation and Republic of Argentina US dollar-denominated
Eurobonds before and after the GKO crisis.  For the Russian bonds, the sample paths
suggest a two-phase revaluation. Shifts in default probabilities account for most of the
initial price collapse.  Marked decreases in the projected default recovery ratio dominate
the continued Russian bond price declines. The  “contagion effect” impact of the default
crisis on the Argentine Eurobond market actually resembles the Russian case much more
than the raw price data indicate.  The crucial Argentine distinction is that investors never
cut recovery value assumptions.
1. Introduction
Russia’s August 1998 default on its ruble-denominated GKO debt obligations
precipitated a severe revaluation of credit risk throughout the global financial markets.1
This default was extraordinary, and punished investors who had assumed that a
government with access to the monetary printing press would always honor its home
currency obligations.2
Of course, investors have always imputed default risk to foreign currency
sovereign debt, especially for emerging market issuers. Echoing this point, the ratings
agencies afford less-than-AAA status for many such sovereign bonds.  As of year-end
1998, Standard & Poor’s rated Russia’s US dollar-denominated debt BBB and similar
Argentine debt BB.  The yield premiums over US Treasury yields demanded for foreign
issuers’ US dollar-denominated debt compensate the holders for bearing default risks.
Such yield premiums fluctuated wildly during the Russian GKO default crisis as default
scenario contagion spread to the markets for emerging market countries’ dollar-
denominated debt.
While the extreme price volatility generated by the Russian crisis was painful to
many investors, it provides a unique window into the impact of changing default
probabilities and recovery ratio assumptions on credit-sensitive sovereign bond prices.
This paper introduces a joint implied parameter approach to sovereign bond pricing to
extract market assumptions about both the expected recovery ratio and the default
probability term structure by applying a consistent valuation framework to a cross-section
of market prices on outstanding bond issues.  Previous empirical analyses of U.S.
2corporate bond pricing such as Fons (1987) and Jarrow, Lando and Turnbull (1997)
exogenously specify default recovery rate parameters based upon previous careful studies
of U.S. historical default experience.  In the emerging sovereign debt markets, no such
recovery histories based upon previous defaults are available for reference.  Moreover,
sovereign default crises are necessarily fluid situations generating possibly major revisions
in investor expectations.
This paper’s empirical section applies the methodology to both Russian Federation
(the catalyst country) and Republic of Argentina (a contagion-effect country) US dollar-
denominated Eurobonds during the GKO crisis.  The empirical strategy aims to answer a
sequence of outstanding questions to fully understand the price dynamics of the emerging
markets debt crash.  First, what were the market’s initial recovery rate assumptions on
these Russian and Argentine Eurobonds?  Second, in both of these markets, what implied
default rate term structures did the cross-section of prices initially reflect?  Third, how did
these assumed recovery ratio and default rate term structure parameters change
throughout the GKO default crisis?  Finally, did shifts in expected recovery values distort
observations of default rate contagion effects?
The implied recovery ratio approach is particularly useful for these Russian and
Argentine applications.  Far from being a typical default, this home-currency Russian GKO
bond default catalyzed a global review of credit risks.  Of course, the most direct impact
of such a watershed event would be on other classes of Russian debt.  Moreover, unlike
Brady Bonds, Russian Federation Eurobonds carry no attached collateral.  By scrutinizing
market reactions via the price fluctuations on the five outstanding Russian Eurobond
3issues during the crisis, the analysis can trace the path of revisions to market expectations
regarding both the recovery ratio and Eurobond default probabilities.  Argentina’s
Eurobond issues also suffered severely from the revaluing of credit risks, but subsequently
recovered most of their losses. A comparative analysis of the Argentine bond price data
gives a broader context for recovery ratio assumptions. The Argentine analysis also
permits a direct characterization of default crisis contagion effects.
The empirical analysis leads to the following conclusions: First, the pre-crisis
implied recovery ratio for Russian Eurobonds is lower than the level that previous
researchers have estimated for US corporate debt.  In contrast, Argentina’s debt embodies
standard US corporate debt recovery ratio assumptions. Second, during the crisis, the
implied default probability on Russian debt rose sharply during the week prior to the GKO
default announcement and then rose again afterwards.  Third, the implied Russian
recovery ratio – reasonably stable prior to the GKO default – fell sharply upon the actual
default announcement.  Fourth, significant downward revisions in this implied recovery
ratio continued even after the default probability stabilized at its higher value.  For the
post-GKO default announcement sample period, market prices imply an average recovery
value for Russian Eurobonds of only ten cents on the dollar. Finally, because of the
divergence between recovery value shifts during this sample period, bond price
comparisons alone understate the depth of the default contagion effect on Argentina.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 reviews the
recovery value concept and details the pricing framework. The framework incorporates a
discounted expected cash flow methodology utilizing the now familiar equivalent
4martingale technique. Section 3 discusses the data.  Section 4 discusses the estimation
strategy.  Section 5 presents results for the Russian Federation Eurobonds.  Section 6
presents the results for the Republic of Argentina Eurobonds. Section 7 discusses
contagion crisis depth.  Section 8 concludes.
2. A Pricing Framework
In principal, risky sovereign debt valuation should proceed along lines similar to
valuation for risky corporate debt.  Except for Brady Bonds (see below), the sovereign
debt default event is couched under a forced “rescheduling” agreement that exchanges the
originally promised cash flow stream for new, more lenient terms.  From the investor’s
perspective, the value of the involuntarily-exchanged new security is less than that of the
original debt.  In a sovereign default, as the Russian GKO exchange package negotiations
showed, power –  not the issuer’s actual ability to pay – may be the most important
determinant of whatever value the investor may recover.
As with risky corporate debt, assumptions about the default recovery ratio – the
percentage of bond par value recovered by the investor after a default – crucially affect
sovereign foreign currency debt valuation.  For different classes of US corporate debt,
investors can utilize a well-documented default experience history to help predict potential
default recovery rates. For example, Altman and Eberhart (1994) examine a sample of 91
US firms that filed for and emerged from Chapter 11 between 1980 and 1992.  The
authors estimate bondholder recovery by actual post-emergence bond market value.  The
sample’s average recovery rate is about 50%, with significant differences among seniority
classes.  Using a much larger sample over the 1978-1998 period, Altman et al (1999)
5estimate the weighted average recovery rate of US corporate debt defaults to be 40% of
face value.
Unlike the US domestic corporate debt markets, the sovereign foreign currency
bond markets offer no rich default experience histories for reference. A large portion of
such debt exists under the Brady Bond structure, where repayment of principal and a
rolling component of the coupon stream is secured by zero-coupon US Treasury Note
collateral. Through the Treasury collateral, the Brady Bond structure ameliorates the
investor’s problem of reliably estimating a default recovery ratio.3  In the absence of such
Brady Bond guarantees, a default crisis scenario for unsecured sovereign debt is destined
to be a fluid situation.
There are four components in the valuation methodology for a specific N-period
maturity bond.  The first is the bond’s notional (i.e., promised) cash flow stream consisting
of coupons and principal value.  Denote the date t coupon payment by Ct and the maturity
date N principal repayment by FN.  The second component is an assumed specific salvage
or recovery value, R, paid to the bondholder immediately upon the event of default.  In the
default portion of the event tree, this immediate substituting payment of R replaces any
remaining cash flows (i.e., the remaining coupons and principal) from the initially
promised stream.  This recovery value represents the default date present value of the
bond’s payment rescheduling. The third component is the adjusted risk-neutral payments
probability distribution under the equivalent martingale measure of Harrison and Kreps
(1979).  Denote the (adjusted) probability of default during the specific date t-1 to date t
period as pt. Denote the (adjusted) probability of a timely payment of the promised date t
6cash flow as Pt.  Since each coupon payment has a “cross-default” provision with every
subsequent coupon,  Pt  represents the cumulative probability of no default occurring from
issue date through date t.4  Thus,  the effect of recovery value is spread out across the
event tree. The fourth valuation component is the risk-free present value discount factor
for a time t cash flow, denoted as ft.
Equation (1) expresses the bond’s current value, V0, as th  expected discounted
cash flow relation:
   N          N
V0 = S  [Pt* ft* Ct]  + [PN* fN* FN]  + S [pt* ft* R] . (1)
t=1                    t=1
As in Jonkhart (1979) and Fons (1987), equation (1) views the bond’s current value as a
probability-weighted sum of three components: coupon flows, principal repayment and
recovery value.  However, following Leland and Toft (1996), the probability distribution
used here is reinterpreted as the implied risk-neutral distribution.
Finally, cross-default provisions with other coupon-paying bonds may also exist.
In this case, recovery value realization on a particular bond may occur even on a date
where no coupon payment is scheduled.  Careful treatment of recovery value as a separate
flow component involves analyzing the specific institutional cross-default framework.
Denote the date t term risk-neutral default probability rate as dt.  The probability of
timely payment of a future date t cash flow follows as:
Pt = (1 -dt) t. (2)
7Previous empirical research on expressions such as equation (1) by Fons (1987) and
Bhanot (1998) consider only a constant probability of default (dt  = ).  Here, assume
instead that the term default rate applying for a period t cash flow can be expressed as a
linear function of time:
 dt  = a + b*t, (3)
where the parameters a and b are restricted to values ensuring that Pt is less than or equal
to unity for all t.  A flat default rate term structure (b = 0; dt  =  a) would imply identical
forward default rates for all periods.  During a crisis, default rates for deferred periods –
which apply to default probabilities in future periods conditional on the sovereign’s ability
to successfully avoid an earlier default – might be lower than near-term default rates.
Equation (3) attempts to improve upon the specifications of previous research to capture
such a default rate curve in a parsimonious manner.5
In sum, the framework incorporates three unknown parameters: R,  nd b.  The
risk-free discount factors and the bond’s notional cash flows are known.  Since
pt = (Pt-1-Pt),  equation (4) embodies an estimable form of the bond valuation expression.
N     
V0  = S  [ (1 - a - b*[t] ) t * ft* Ct]   +  (1 - a - b*[N] ) N * fN* FN
t=1
    N
+ S [ ( (1 - a - b*[t-1]) t-1  - (1 - a - b*[t]) t  ) * ft* R] .         (4)
   t=1
83. The Data
As of year-end 1998, the Russian Federation had five bullet US dollar-
denominated Eurobond issues outstanding: the 9.25% 11/27/01 (Russia-01);  the 11.75
6/10/03 (Russia-03);  the 8.75% 7/24/05 (Russia-05); the 10% 6/26/07 (Russia-07); and
the 11% 7/24/18 (Russia-18).6  Thus, from the inception of the GKO crisis, the five
bonds’ maturity spectrum spanned between two and twenty years. The total par value of
all of Russia’s Eurobond issues is approximately $13.7 billion. These bonds are the
unsecured debt obligations of the Russian Federation and are governed by the laws of
England.  Each bond’s cross-default provision is triggered should the Russian Federation
default on any of its other Eurobonds or other public external indebtedness.
For the same period, the Republic of Argentina also had five bullet US dollar-
denominated Eurobond issues outstanding: the 9.25% 2/23/01 (Arg-01);  the 8.375
12/20/03 (Arg-03);  the 11% 10/9/06 (Arg-06); the 11.375% 1/30/17 (Arg-17); and the
9.75% 9/19/27 (Arg-27). Thus, from the inception of the GKO crisis, the five Argentine
bonds’ maturity spectrum spanned between two and thirty years. The total par value of all
of these fixed-rate Argentine Eurobond issues is approximately $11.5 billion. These bonds
are the unsecured debt obligations of the Republic of Argentina and are governed by the
laws of England.
The bonds of both issuers trade in an over-the-counter dealer market. As might be
anticipated, the August crisis triggered important changes in the structure of the Russian
market.  Prior to August, about twenty firms acted as market-makers, though only about
ten could be relied upon to supply liquidity on a consistent basis. In the aftermath of the
9crisis, only about one-half of these firms continued to participate as dealers.  The crisis
also changed the mix of customer order flow, as hedge funds and Russian trading firms
exited the market.  Average trading volume shrank from pre-crisis levels of approximately
$10 billion per day to no more than $500 million (in March 1999).  Markets are made in
all five bonds, but the longer-term issues exhibit greater liquidity.
This study’s bond price data are mid-market bond prices collected once each day
off of dealer-contributed Reuters bond pricing pages for each date in the sample. Because
of the substantial market disarray during the period, even screen-collected prices may be
suspect. Indeed, the sample contains no Russian bond prices for August 17th, the day the
screens went blank. Nevertheless, these collected Eurobond prices passed a reliability
cross-check with the closing bid-side marks of a major bond dealer.  The mid-market
prices used reflect bond values more accurately than bid-side prices, since bid-asked
spreads widened precipitously during the heat of the crisis. The study’s sample period
starts on July 23, 1998 and ends on December 14, 1998.  Corresponding risk-free discount
factors applying to each cash flow date were imputed from daily closing Treasury yield
curve data.
Table 1 presents a descriptive overview of the Russian and Argentine bonds,
including their outstanding par value, initial settlement date, and price and yield ranges
over the sample period.
<Insert Table 1>
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Figure 1 plots the Russia-18’s and Argentina-17’s market prices between July 23rd and
December 14th.  The Russian bond price – initially stable during the halcyon last week of
July – fell steadily from August 5th through August 14th as the global markets as the
markets began to get nervous; plummeted in response to the August 17th GKO default
announcement; dropped sharply once again later during the last week of August;  and then
stabilized for the rest of the sample period.  The Argentine bond price tracked the Russian
market during its August decline, but then recovered. However, even at the deepest point
of the crisis, the Argentine bond never marked less than 70 price points.  The lowest
Russian bond mark was 12.5 price points.
<Insert Figure 1 Here>
4. Empirical Analysis
To repeat, he empirical investigation focuses on four questions. First, what were
the market’s initial recovery rate assumptions on these Russian and Argentine Eurobonds?
Second, in both of these markets, what implied default rate term structures did the cross-
section of prices initially reflect?  Third, how did these assumed recovery ratio and default
rate term structure parameters change throughout the GKO default crisis?  Finally, did
shifts in expected recovery values distort observations of default rate contagion effects?
For each market, the estimation strategy proceeds as follows.  Recall equation (4),
                                                                                                         ^
the expression for bond value.   Define a bond’s “model value,”  V0 , by substituting the
     ^      ^              ^
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estimates a,  b  and R  into equation (4).  Now, at date 0, consider a cross-section of I
outstanding issues indexed by the subscript i with a common cross-default provision.
Define the sum of squared residuals across the I outstanding issues on date 0 as
    I          ^     
SSR0   = S  (Vi,0 - Vi,0)2 (5)
   i =1
where Vi,0 is now interpreted as the date 0 market value for the ith bond.  Estimates of the
date 0 implied model parameters can be derived by choosing values for
 ^      ^              ^
a,  b  and R that minimize SSR0 in equation 5 while simultaneously constraining the
average of the cross-sectional bond pricing residuals to equal zero:7
             I                 ^     
(1/I)  S  (Vi,0 - Vi,0)  = 0. (6)
           i =1
           .
Implementing the strategy requires the following steps. For each day in the sample,
construct the cash flow event tree for each of the I bonds.8  Next, apply equation (4)
representing each bond’s value as the sum of its discounted probability-weighted cash
flows. Finally, using initial guesses for the unknown parameters R, a, and b, search for the
values that minimize that day’s sum of squared cross-sectional bond pricing residuals
while setting the cross-sectional average error to zero.
Parameter estimates are computed using an algorithm for nonlinear optimization
subject to nonlinear constraints.9  The convergence algorithm does not guarantee that the
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final estimates are global solutions.  This is a general problem with search algorithms in
nonlinear optimization. Some experimentation with alternative initial guesses showed that
starting points generally did not make a crucial difference to the estimation results.  Of
course, another index to the credibility of an estimation procedure is the reasonableness of
its results.   These are presented below.
5. Results for Russian Federation Eurobonds
Table 2 reports summary statistics for the Russian market’s time series of daily
parameter estimates over the full sample.  The average implied recovery ratio for these
Russian bonds was estimated at 13.1%, significantly lower than the 40%-50% ex post
ratios cited above for US corporate defaults. The average default rate term structure
parameters – base rate of 0.37; slope of  .0176 per year – implied average payment
probabilities of 36% for a 2-year-ahead date; 5% for a 5-year date; and 0% for a 10-year
date. All three model parameter series exhibited substantial daily variation.
Table 3 reports similar Russian market results for two sub-samples  partitioned
into pre-August 17, 1998 and post-August 17 periods.  As might be anticipated, there are
large differences in the default rate term structure parameter estimates across the two sub-
samples.  The average post-announcement base default rate more than doubled its pre-
announcement level (from .17 to .41).  In both sub-samples, the estimate slope coefficient
was positive. However, the correlation between the default function intercept and slope
parameters was negative.
Unlike the case of the default rate parameters, a stylized credit crisis need not
predict shifts in the implied default recovery ratio.  A default recovery ratio only takes on
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meaning conditional upon the occurrence of the default event.  Its value could be
independent of changes in the probability that the event occurs, unless relevant news is
changing both simultaneously. Thus, there is no theoretical reason why the implied
recovery rate need change in a crisis.  However, the Table 3 estimates clearly show that a
dramatic fall did occur in the post-announcement sub-sample.  The pre-announcement
average recovery ratio estimate was 27.3%.  Thus, even the pre-crisis Russian recovery
value estimate is lower than the 40%-50% average historical levels cited above for US
corporate x post default recovery experience.  For the post-announcement period, the
implied recovery ratio estimate was 10.4%.  In Russia’s case, the rise in default probability
was accompanied by a significant downward revision in assumed recovery value.
Table 3 also reports test statistics that strongly reject the null hypothesis that the
Russia Eurobond recovery ratio and the default rate function intercept were constant
across the August 17th break point.
<Insert Tables 2 and 3 here>
Figure 2 plots the daily estimates of the implied recovery ratio (R) and the default
rate function’s intercept coefficient (a).  The plot provides additional depth to the nature
of the Russian Eurobond market crash. From the viewpoint of the base default rate, the
crisis had completed a good deal of its repricing by August 14th.  The annualized default
rate function intercept rose from below 0.10 to about 0.30 as the markets became
increasingly apprehensive about Russia’s finances.  In response to the August 17 GKO
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announcement, the base default rate jumped overnight to near 0.40 – essentially its
average value for the remainder of the period.  Yet, as Figure 1 showed, bond prices
continued to fall throughout the rest of the month.  The estimates reveal that further
downward revisions in the implied recovery ratio accounted for the continued market
declines.  In particular, the estimated recovery ratio collapsed 8.25 points overnight on
August 25th (from $23.0 to $14.75 per $100 of par value), and fell another 13.45 points
from the 25th to its $1.3 low on October 14th.
<Insert Figure 2 here>
Figure 3 displays the quantitative value significance of these recovery ratio
revisions by comparing the Russia-18’s model price at the estimated recovery ratio against
a counterfactual simulated Russia-18 price. The point of this exercise is to show how
much market revisions to recovery value mattered during the crisis: to quantify recovery
revaluation effects on prices as distinct from default probability revision effects. Table 3
computes its counterfactual simulated price by applying the sample estimates for a and b,
but only after keeping the recovery ratio parameter fixed at 25% throughout the sample
(R=$25 per $100 of par value).  The gap between the true and counterfactual prices
increases as the implied recovery ratio falls.  Indeed, the post-GKO default announcement
sample’s average difference was about 13.5 price points.  The largest difference occurred
on  October 14th, when the gap rose to 21.9 price points.   The period between August
18th and October 15th was particularly interesting.  The implied payment probability
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prospects actually brightened – a in Figure 2 decreased and the counterfactual R = 25
price in Figure 3 rose – while market bond prices continue to fall significantly.
<Insert Figure 3 here>
6. Results for Republic of Argentina Eurobonds
Table 4 reports summary statistics for the Argentine market’s time series of daily
parameter estimates over the full sample.  The average implied recovery ratio for these
Republic of Argentina bonds was estimated at 49.6%, in line with the 40%-50% average
ex post ratios cited above for US corporate defaults. The average default rate term
structure parameters – base rate of 0.128; slope of  .0023 per year – implied average
payment probabilities of 75% for a 2-year-ahead date; 47% for a 5-year date; and 19% for
a 10-year date.
Table 5 reports similar Republic of Argentina Eurobond market results for the two
sub-samples partitioned into pre-August 17, 1998 and post-August 17 periods.  As with
the Russian market data, there were large differences in the default rate term structure
parameter estimates across the two sub-samples.  The average post-announcement base
default rate quadrupled its pre-announcement level (to .148 from .034).  And as with
Russia, while the estimate slope coefficient was positive in both sub-samples, the
correlation between the default function intercept and slope parameters was negative.
Table 5 also reports test statistics for the null hypothesis that the Argentine
Eurobond recovery ratio and the default rate function parameters were constant across the
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August 17th break point.  In contrast to the results for Russian bonds, the constant
recovery ratio hypothesis cannot be rejected.  Nevertheless, the hypotheses of constant
default rate function parameters – both intercept and slope – can be rejected at standard
levels of significance. Figure 4 plots the daily estimates of the implied recovery ratio (R)
and the default rate function’s intercept coefficient (a) for these Republic of Argentina
Eurobonds.
<Insert Tables 4 and 5 here>
<Insert Figure 4 here>
7. Crisis Depth
Perceived gains from diversifying an emerging market investment allocation across
a wide set of different country credits depend on the correlations among country bond
markets.  If asset correlations tend to rise in times of crisis, much of the originally
perceived benefits from diversification is negated.  In the emerging fixed income markets,
the rising correlations during credit crises are termed “contagion effects.”  An increase in
the implied probability of default of one sovereign issuer’s debt (e.g., Russia) causes
corresponding implied default probability increases for others (e.g., Argentina) as
emerging market investors simultaneously rush to shrink their portfolio exposures.
But in the current context, interpreting even the most basic data concerning the
relative depths of the GKO default crisis among different emerging markets is problematic.
As depicted in Figure 1, while Argentine Eurobond prices followed Russian bond prices
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down from mid-August to mid-September, the crash in Argentine bond prices was
significantly less severe.
Yet, a very different picture of the relative depths of the crisis appears in Figure 5.
This figure plots the estimated payment probability for a 5-year horizon cash flow date in
each market.  The implied five-year Argentine payment probability began August at 75%.
It collapsed to an average of 21% for the first-half of September.  Thus, the true default
crisis in the Argentine market actually resembled Russia much more than the raw price
data indicates.  Default crisis contagion effects from Russian to Argentine Eurobonds were
extremely strong. The crucial distinction between the two bond markets is that investor
perception of the Argentine recovery value floor never buckled.  In contrast, recovery
value under a Russian default was essentially written off.   The lesson for Argentina:
default crisis contagion effects are very real.  What saved the Argentine market from a
more severe crash was ongoing investor confidence in being treated fairly under a
potential default scenario.
 8. Conclusions
The results here support the hypothesis that significant downward revisions in the
market’s assessment of default recovery ratios played a significant roll in the 1998 crash of
Russian Federation Eurobond prices.  What caused these substantial downward revisions?
The most likely factor was the unveiling of the first Russian government  proposals for
restructuring the defaulted ruble-denominated GKO debt.  These first proposals, released
the week after the default, lacked clear details on the pricing of  a proposed ruble-into-
dollar debt swap.  The details regarding possible trading restrictions on either the new
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ruble or new dollar security alternatives were also sketchy.  More clarity about the
situation did not appear until early December 1998.  Major international banks deemed the
initial plan – along with several revisions – unacceptable.  However, one conclusion was
clear: investors would fare worse than they had originally anticipated. This GKO outcome
most certainly influenced the continued price declines in the Russian Eurobond market.10
While the extreme price volatility generated by the Russian crisis was painful to
many investors, it provides a unique window into the impact of changing default
probabilities and recovery ratio assumptions on credit-sensitive sovereign bond prices.
This paper’s findings highlight difficulties portfolio managers and, especially, market
makers face assessing and hedging credit-sensitive sovereign bond price risks.  Clearly,
hedge ratios designed using standard spread duration measures are inappropriate for
hedging credit risk dimensions when recovery ratio revaluation plays a role. And as the
Russian Eurobond case presented here reveals, market recovery ratio perceptions are
fragile. Moreover, shifts in recovery ratio perceptions can be as quantitatively important
for bond prices as shifts in default probabilities.
Interpreting the estimates of market recovery ratio assumptions for Russia (pre-
crisis: 27%) and Argentine (about 50%) may be fertile ground for political economists.
Certainly, these estimates give some perspective to the deeper question: what is an
appropriate recovery value for sovereign debt?  Much to the dismay of the international
banks involved in the GKO default negotiations, raw bargaining power – not reserve
levels, net exports or other cash flow factors – may be the true fundamental.
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Finally, the implied recovery value approach is not only applicable to emerging
market sovereign debt. The methodology can also be exploited to further understand the
pricing of US corporate debt markets.  Substantial historical data exists on US corporate
bondholder x post  recovery experience.  Applying this paper’s technique may help define
whether such recoveries have been high or low relative to ex an e market assessments;
whether recovery prospects for US corporate debt are subject to major periodic shifts; and
whether – as in Russia’s case – dramatic downward revisions are conceived in crisis.
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Footnotes
1 GKOs – Gosudarstvennye Kratkosrochnye Obyazatel’stva – are ruble-denominated state
treasury bills. The Russian Federation defaulted on its GKOs in the domestic debt
restructuring plan announced on August 17, 1998.
2 Standard and Poor’s reports seven previous instances of a sovereign’s default on home
currency debt. See Chambers [1997].
3 See Claessens and Pennachi [1996] and Bhanot [1998] for empirical analysis of Brady
bonds.
4 Hence, the probability of receiving the recovery value R on any date t, pt, can be written
as pt = (Pt-1-Pt), the probability of default during the specific date t-1 to date t period.
Alternatively, Pt, the probability of receiving a promised date t coupon payment can be
          t
expressed as Pt = 1 - S ps.
                                       s=1
5 Absent recovery value (R=0), equation (3) would imply a simple term structure for pure
default credit yield spreads.  In fact, if b = 0, all zero coupon bonds would share the same
yield spread over the risk free yield. The introduction of a lumpy positive recovery value
alters this result, and breaks down the pure correspondence between yield spread and
default rates.
6 Another Russian issue, the 11% 7/24/28 containing a 7/24/08 par put provision, was
excluded from consideration.  The $13.7 billion total Eurobond issuance size quoted
below includes $2.5 billion of this 2028 maturity bond.
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7 The estimation procedure also restricts the recovery ratio and all bond cash flow date
payment probabilities to be nonnegative. An earlier draft also reported Russian model
estimates for a case without the current nonn gativity constraint on the recovery ratio, but
where the model priced the longest maturity issue (the Russia-18s) exactly.  That case’s
results were broadly consistent with those reported here, but negative values for the
recovery ratio were estimated during a two-week global liquidity crisis episode during the
October 1998.
8 We assume that default occurs only on a bond cash flow date. Because of  cross-default
provisions, a default on any one of an issuer’s bonds triggers a default on every issue.
9 The GRG2 (generalized reduced gradient) algorithm for nonlinear optimization subject
to nonlinear constraints was used. This algorithm is generally available through
Microsoft’s Excel software package.
10GKO rescheduling negotiations and revisions dragged on until the major international
banks began agreeing to terms in March 1999.
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Table 1
Russian Federation and Republic of Argentina Eurobond Descriptions
Sample Statistics
July 23, 1998 - December 14, 1998
Initial Par Value Price Range Yield Range
Issue Coupon Maturity Settlement ($000s) Max. Min. Min. Max.
Russia-01 9.25 11/27/01 11/27/96 1,000,000$    88.8 25.0 13.2% 73.2%
Russia-03 11.75 6/10/03 6/10/98 1,250,000$    89.2 15.0 14.4% 92.5%
Russia-05 8.75 7/24/05 7/24/98 2,968,968$    71.4 13.0 15.1% 73.5%
Russia-07 10 6/26/07 6/26/97 2,400,000$    75.2 17.0 14.6% 61.1%
Russia-18 11 7/24/18 7/24/98 3,446,671$    71.2 12.5 15.4% 86.3%
Arg-01 9.25 2/23/01 2/23/96 1,200,000$    103.5 74.9 7.7% 23.3%
Arg-03 8.375 12/20/03 12/20/93 1,800,000$    102.1 71.3 7.9% 16.8%
Arg-06 11 10/9/06 10/9/96 1,300,000$    109.1 74.5 9.4% 16.9%
Arg-17 11.375 1/30/17 1/30/97 3,875,000$    110.1 70.4 10.2% 16.5%
Arg-27 9.75 9/19/27 9/19/97 3,350,000$    96.8 61.9 10.1% 15.9%
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Table 2
Russian Eurobond Implied Recovery Ratio and Default Rate Function Estimates
Full Sample Estimates: July 23, 1998 - December 14, 1998
Recovery Default Rate Default Rate
Ratio (R) Intercept (a) Slope (b)
Sample Mean 13.0 0.368 0.0176
Std. Dev. 3.7 0.054 0.0191
Maximum 31.3 0.593 0.0404
Minimum 1.3 0.084 -0.0130
Correlation 1.00 -0.56 -0.23
Matrix 1.00 -0.15
1.00
Implied Horizon Payment Probability
2-Year 5-Year 10-Year
36% 5% 0%
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Table 3  
Russian Eurobond Implied Recovery Ratio and Default Rate Function Estimates
Pre-GKO Default Subsample: July 23, 1998 - August 14, 1998
Recovery Default Rate Default Rate
Ratio (R) Intercept (a) Slope (b)
Sample Mean 27.3 0.166 0.0072
Std. Dev. 3.0 0.078 0.0103
Maximum 31.3 0.306 0.0404
Minimum 20.7 0.084 -0.0048
R a b
Correlation 1.00 -0.28 0.16
Matrix 1.00 -0.13
1.00
Implied Horizon Payment Probability
2-Year 5-Year 10-Year
67% 32% 7%
Post-GKO Default Subsample: August 17, 1998 - December 14, 1998
Recovery Default Rate Default Rate
Ratio (R) Intercept (a) Slope (b)
Sample Mean 10.3 0.406 0.0196
Std. Dev. 5.8 0.054 0.0183
Maximum 29.5 0.593 0.0345
Minimum 1.3 0.318 -0.0130
R a b
Correlation 1.00 0.25 -0.07
Matrix 1.00 -0.80
1.00
Implied Horizon Payment Probability
2-Year 5-Year 10-Year
31% 3% 0%
Chi-Square Statistics: Tests of Equality of Means Across Subsamples
Recovery Default Rate Default Rate
Ratio (R) Intercept (a) Slope (b)
73.7 104.7 6.0
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Table 4
Republic of Argentina Eurobond Implied Recovery Ratio and 
Default Rate Function Estimates
Full Sample Estimates: July 23, 1998 - December 14, 1998
Recovery Default Rate Default Rate
Ratio (R) Intercept (a) Slope (b)
Sample Mean 49.6 0.128 0.0023
Std. Dev. 5.4 0.009 0.0021
Maximum 86.7 0.668 0.0111
Minimum 34.5 0.023 -0.0142
R a b
Correlation 1.00 0.48 -0.06
Matrix 1.00 -0.81
1.00
Implied Horizon Payment Probability
2-Year 5-Year 10-Year
75% 47% 19%
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Table 5
Republic of Argentina Eurobond Implied Recovery Ratio and 
Default Rate Function Estimates
Pre-GKO Default Subsample: July 23, 1998 - August 14, 1998
Recovery Default Rate Default Rate
Ratio (R) Intercept (a) Slope (b)
Sample Mean 51.2 0.034 0.0063
Std. Dev. 2.7 0.011 0.0015
Maximum 54.0 0.056 0.0109
Minimum 44.7 0.023 0.0044
R a b
Correlation 1.00 -0.18 -0.19
Matrix 1.00 -0.13
1.00
Implied Horizon Payment Probability
2-Year 5-Year 10-Year
91% 71% 36%
Post-GKO Default Subsample: August 17, 1998 - December 14, 1998
Recovery Default Rate Default Rate
Ratio (R) Intercept (a) Slope (b)
Sample Mean 49.3 0.148 0.0014
Std. Dev. 10.2 0.103 0.0042
Maximum 86.7 0.668 0.0111
Minimum 34.5 0.045 -0.0142
R a b
Correlation 1.00 0.58 -0.10
Matrix 1.00 -0.78
1.00
Implied Horizon Payment Probability
2-Year 5-Year 10-Year
72% 43% 17%
Chi-Square Statistics: Tests of Equality of Means Across Subsamples
Recovery Default Rate Default Rate
Ratio (R) Intercept (a) Slope (b)
0.4 16.0 15.4
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Figure 1
20-Year Russian vs. Argentine Eurobond Prices
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Figure 2
Implied Recovery Ratio and Base Default Rate: Russia
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Figure 3
Russia 18 Prices at Implied Recovery Ratio versus Counterfactual Price at Constant R = 25
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Figure 4
Implied Recovery Ratio and Base Default Rate: Argentina
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Figure 5
5-Year Horizon Payment Probabilities: Russia vs. Argentina
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